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Deployment Strategies for Service Innovation  
Abstract 
In large organizations, local use of innovations is not enough; extracting the full use of the 
innovation requires deployment across the organization. The purpose of this paper is to explore 
strategies for the deployment of service innovations and factors influencing success. We adopt an 
inductive theory-building approach with a longitudinal embedded case study of 10 successful 
service innovations. We find two deployment strategies: required adoption, in which subsidiaries 
are required to adopt innovations, and voluntary adoption, in which adoption is not compulsory – 
innovations are showcased, but the adoption decision is left to the subsidiaries. We have 
investigated the factors influencing deployment, including the decentralized nature of service 
innovation, fit with the internal and external context, extrinsic and intrinsic motivations, and 
handovers. Based on analyses of case evidence, we put forward research propositions accordingly. 
This research provides managerial guidance for multi-divisional organizations to extract full value 
from service innovations. Although some results may be particular to the Chinese context, research 
in other contexts can broaden the generalizability of the findings. 
Index Terms: Service innovation, deployment strategies, innovation diffusion, longitudinal case 
study, multi-divisional organizations 
Managerial Relevance Statement: The results of this research are relevant to service 
organizations, especially large multi-divisional ones. These large organizations not only need to 
innovate rapidly and successfully, but also must thoroughly deploy the initially successful 
innovations. The first implication for practice is that actively promoting a service innovation and 
requiring others to adopt, a required-deployment strategy will lead to more rapid deployment, but 
there are resource constraints on how many innovations can be required to adopt at any one time. 
The second implication is to have in place mechanisms for making other potentially valuable 
innovations visible to potential internal adopters with a voluntary-deployment strategy. The third 
implication is that managerial efforts addressing fit or motivational issues could be done in tandem 
with deployment strategies to encourage faster and wider adoption. The final implication is that if 
the development team does not have the necessary capabilities or resources to manage deployment, 
the innovation should be handed over to a team that does, which may also involve a change in the 
deployment strategy.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Service innovation stimulation has been identified as a major strategic priority for research and 
practice [1]. However, the development and successful use of a service innovation do not 
necessarily guarantee its broader deployment and success. As such, Ostrom et al. [2] suggested 
that identifying drivers of sustained service innovation is an important direction for future research. 
For example, a new technology may be introduced amid great enthusiasm and enjoy widespread 
initial acquisition, but may nevertheless fail to be thoroughly deployed. This is of particular 
concern in a multi-divisional firm in which innovations and technologies need to be deployed 
across diverse parts of the organization. Current innovation research in services and products 
focuses primarily on the process and strategies for developing innovations: “Many new product 
introductions continue to be unsuccessful, and while researchers have studied product 
development processes, relatively few studies directly address new product launch” [3]:901. We 
study intra-company deployment, i.e., the process of taking innovations and successfully 
transferring them across all appropriate divisions of the organization, leading to successful internal 
use or delivery of services to customers. 
The first objective of this research is to develop our understanding of the deployment of 
service innovations, which “has not received sufficient attention in the empirical literature” 
[4]:1067. Costa et al. [5] and Wang et al. [6] reemphasized the need to investigate deployment 
issues (especially in a service context) to maximize profits. Building on the seminal work by 
Ghoshal and Bartlett [7], we propose two strategies for the intra-company deployment of service 
innovations: required adoption, in which subsidiaries are required to adopt innovations, and 
voluntary adoption, in which adoption is not compulsory – innovations are showcased, but the 
adoption decision is left to the subsidiaries. 
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The service context presents challenges for deployment. In services, and particularly digital 
services, companies are increasingly seeking to create and deploy innovations rapidly. Service 
innovations can originate at all levels of the organization, ranging from the front line to central 
development and open innovation approaches [8]. The distributed nature of this process can pose 
problems for the management of deployments. The ability to leverage the innovative and 
entrepreneurial potential of multi-divisional companies’ assets in different places is a fundamental 
strategic imperative [9].  
The second objective of our research is thus to understand the factors that explain failed 
deployment or limit the potential broader success of deployment. We do this by conducting a 
longitudinal study of a set of successful service innovations in a major mobile telecom 
organization. The 10 service innovations are mainly service product innovations, but some also 
relate to new business models based on process and/or product innovations [2, 6]. We develop five 
propositions concerning their deployment. The contribution of this paper is to advance our 
understanding of the process and strategies for deploying service innovations, which can enhance 
competitive advantage. 
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
A. Intra-company Deployment of Service Innovation 
Research on deployment in many contexts is a difficult task. Fichman and Kemerer [10] contended 
that for innovations in IT to have a positive effect on quality and productivity, they must be 
effectively deployed, but a large proportion of the innovations studied failed to be fully deployed. 
Done et al. [11] found various degrees of deployment of process innovations, with full deployment 
in only one of the seven cases studied. Jensen and Szulanski [12], studying the intra-company 
transfer or deployment of new management practices, found mixed results. One set of practices 
had a high degree of effective adoption. Another set faced strong resistance, “Some countries 
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openly refused, but most feigned enthusiasm while giving implementation only a token effort,” (p. 
172) leading to low adoption. 
In this study, we focus on the internal adoption of innovations across diverse parts in a multi-
divisional organization. This intra-company deployment process is influenced by both innovation 
factors and organizational factors. One model for deployment of innovations is diffusion [13]. The 
speed of adoption is affected by how information about the innovation is communicated, social 
aspects such as norms, and the interconnectedness of those concerned. Extant models of diffusion 
are based on users gaining information and then deciding whether to adopt [14]; however, 
successful deployment sometimes necessitates the user being required to adopt.  
Ghoshal and Bartlett [7] studied the influence of organizational attributes on the creation, 
adoption, and deployment of innovations—new products, processes, or administrative systems—
by the subsidiaries of multinational corporations (MNCs). They saw deployment as having two 
possible forms: required adoption and diffusion. equired adoption occurs when a parent company 
requires its subsidiaries to adopt innovations developed by the parent company, a central R&D 
facility, or other subsidiaries of the company; diffusion occurs when a parent company requires its 
innovation-developing subsidiaries to diffuse their local innovations to the parent company or to 
other subsidiaries.  
B. Required versus Voluntary Adoption  
We build on Ghoshal and Bartlett’s [7] approaches and propose and examine two alternate 
strategies for deployment: required adoption and voluntary adoption.  
In intra-company deployment, we define required adoption as a strategy in which a parent 
company requires other parts of the organization to adopt an innovation. We define a voluntary 
adoption as a deployment strategy in which processes are put in place to allow for diffusion of 
chosen innovations internally on a voluntary basis. We take a broader view than Ghoshal and 
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Bartlett [7] in that innovators may or may not be required to seek innovation diffusion. The adopter 
is the primary driver behind the adoption decision, but the innovator plays a role in encouraging 
adoption. Similarly, in innovation management literature it has been argued that companies have 
a choice between “push” (technology) or “pull” (market) strategies [15-17] to drive the creation of 
innovation, and must choose a strategy suited to each individual innovation [18]. We argue that 
after the creation phase, in the deployment phase companies still need to make strategic choices 
(required versus voluntary adoption) suited to each innovation. This leads to the following research 
questions:  
RQ1: What patterns of deployment strategies are used for service innovations? 
RQ2: What factors determine the conditions under which these strategies should be used? 
RQ3: What are the other factors (in addition to deployment strategies) that influence the 
deployment outcomes? 
C. Market or Organizational Fit 
When many innovations are deployed, both required and voluntary adoptions can take place. 
Although the strategies for deployment may directly affect the deployment process and outcomes, 
other project-specific factors and organizational factors may also be influential. The attributes of 
an innovation, especially its fit with the market and potential users, strongly affect its adoption 
[13]. An innovation that better fits its potential users will diffuse faster. However, in required 
adoption, all relevant organizations should in principle adopt the innovation regardless of fit, 
though we would expect that the company would consider fit before requiring adoption. Even 
when being required, the subsidiary/division may be reluctant to use or market the innovation if 
the fit is poor. Companies might resist adoption for at least two reasons. Market or user context 
can vary substantially for service innovation [19], resulting in failed or slow deployments in 
contexts with poor fit. There may also be non-market fit issues, such as insufficient resources (or 
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capability) or lack of connections to appropriate suppliers in the adopting organization, which are 
seen as organizational fit issues and would result in failed or slow deployments as well. 
D. The Locus of Service Innovation  
Another important characteristic of innovation in services is the distributed (or divided) nature of 
the innovation process and its organization; although some innovation takes place in central R&D, 
much takes place elsewhere. Zomerdijk and Voss [20] observed a wide range of structures and 
responsibilities for service innovation, and found that “one of the most striking observations was 
the degree to which the development and improvement of service resided in the functional areas” 
(p. 13). In services, the final product often is co-created in the interaction between a customer and 
a service provider; therefore the role that front-line employees play is of major importance [21]. 
We posit that the locus of dev lopment of an innovation will affect the approach to 
deployment. There could be two possible effects. First, innovations developed centrally will be 
more visible to senior management than those developed locally and are thus more likely to be 
selected for either required or voluntary deployment. Second, innovations developed centrally are 
more likely to focus on organization-wide impact and are thus more likely to be required to adopt 
for all subsidiaries or divisions. Of course, the organization may also directly promote the 
innovations developed by subsidiaries and deploy the innovations in other subsidiaries. Thus, 
distance from the center makes it more difficult for innovators to get the attention and the resources 
that they need for deployment.  
In addition, organizational attributes such as autonomy and internal communication are 
influential factors affecting the deployment of innovations [7]. Engaging front-line employees in 
the innovation process contributes to the internal marketing of the new service, facilitating 
implementation and acceptance [22]. The scope of a subsidiary’s innovation is local until the 
broader organization recognizes the innovation’s value, but recognition may be hindered by 
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organizational constraints (e.g., the degree of subsidiary autonomy and the size of the organization) 
and innovation applicability issues. Because of certain innovation features, deploying the same 
innovations in other contexts may be difficult [23].  
E. Senior Management Attention and Support  
Although accessing resources is critical for service innovation [24], we argue that it is just as 
important for deployment. It can involve organizational change, managerial problems, and 
allocation of key resources, all of which require high senior management support [25]. Senior 
management attention is a critical, scarce, and sought-after resource in organizations. In a context 
in which there are multiple innovations, the attention and support of senior management can 
potentially affect the success of the deployment [26]. Young and Jordan [27] suggested that “top 
management support is the most important critical success factor for project success and is not 
simply one of many factors.” It is especially important for service innovation because senior 
management support for risk-taking efforts is an important aspect of new service development 
culture [28]. We argue that for service innovations developed by subsidiaries, it is critical to get 
the attention and support of senior management so that the service innovations can be deployed to 
other subsidiaries. As financial and management attention resources are limited, not all innovations 
will receive enough management attention, thus affecting their ability to be deployed. This may 
lead to subsidiaries competing for headquarters’ attention to acquire resources [29].  
F. Motivation 
An innovation team that is motivated to exploit their innovation locally may not be motivated to 
devote the time and effort needed for wider deployment. Indeed, it may detract from their 
continuing work on development or day-to-day management: “A knowledge source may be 
reluctant to share crucial knowledge for fear of losing ownership, a position of privilege, 
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superiority; it may resent not being adequately rewarded for sharing hard won success; or it may 
be unwilling to devote time and resources to support the transfer” [30]:31.  
Motivation can be extrinsic or intrinsic. Extrinsic motivation refers to performing an activity 
to attain a separable outcome. Intrinsic motivation refers to doing an activity simply for the 
enjoyment of the activity itself instead of for its instrumental value [31]. Researchers agree that 
intrinsic motivation is vital for innovation. Birkinshaw et al. [32] contended that innovation does 
not require monetary rewards. Innovation is intrinsically enjoyable, and it is easy to recognize and 
confer status on those who put their discretionary effort into innovation. In deployment, intrinsic 
motivation can result from the pride and satisfaction of having developed a successful innovation 
and from the association with the potential social and economic benefits if the innovation is widely 
deployed. However, De Jong and D n Hartog [33] argued that intrinsic motivation is not a 
prerequisite for effective implementation and Ko et al. [34] found that intrinsic motivation is more 
important than extrinsic motivation except in implementation. Extrinsic motivation can result from 
many sources, from payment to promotion. The deployment of innovations differs from their 
development: development requires greater creativity, and deployment requires operational and 
internal marketing skills. 
G. Handover of Responsibility 
R&D and deployment decisions are clearly linked [4]; thus the arrangements for the interaction or 
transition between the development and deployment processes are important. The project teams 
responsible for the development process of new services may not necessarily be the teams in 
charge of the deployment process. In deploying an innovation, an organization may have a choice 
as to whether to use the team that developed and introduced the innovation locally for its 
subsequent deployment or to hand responsibility over to another group to manage company-wide 
deployment (a handover).  
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Although a handover can provide more appropriate resources and capability for further 
deployment, it may hinder deployment due to the need for knowledge transfer; handover 
knowledge is “sticky” [35]. A change in the project team or membership can result in a flux in 
coordination [36], and changes in project scope often require effective knowledge-sharing 
practices [37, 38].  
III. METHODOLOGY 
Case studies are a preferred research strategy in building or extending theories. They use one or 
more cases to create theoretical constructs, propositions, and/or midrange theories from case-based 
evidence [39]. We adopt an embedded multiple case study methodology based on grounded theory 
and an inductive approach [40-42]. We have longitudinally studied the deployment processes of 
10 service innovations within a larg  company, supported by secondary data collection and 
archival data. A real-time longitudinal approach helps build a more complete view of the process 
[43]. The unit of analysis is an innovation project, consistent with Carrillo et al. [44], who suggest 
that studies at the project and individual level are needed to better understand aspects of innovation. 
The need to study multiple projects in an innovative environment and to compare them in a 
controlled manner guided case selection [42]. The mobile telecommunications industry is one of 
the most important and rapidly changing industries in the world. Technologies, government 
policies, and intensifying competition have led companies in this industry to develop new services 
or new business models to maintain or increase their market share. We study 10 cases in a major 
mobile telecom operator in China. This operator is a listed company, with around 70 percent of its 
shares held by a state-owned holding company and others held by the public. As one of the largest 
operators in the world, the company has a reputation for success, not only in terms of its market 
share and revenue, but also in terms of its innovative new services introduced to the market. It is 
recognized both inside and outside China for its innovation, and was ranked among the “The 50 
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most Innovative Companies” in 2010 by Business Week. The company provides a full range of 
mobile telecommunications services in all 31 provinces, autonomous regions and directly 
administered municipalities in Mainland China and in Hong Kong, via its 31 independently 
operating provincial subsidiaries (each having many city-level subsidiaries). Each regional 
subsidiary is responsible for its own profit and operations within the geographical region, although 
the top management of the subsidiaries are appointed by a higher-level headquarters. The company 
also has functional departments and research centers at both the national- and provincial 
headquarters levels.  
When building theory from case studies, case selection should use replication logic rather than 
sampling logic [41]. Each case should be selected so that it either a) generates similar results (literal 
replication), or b) produces contrary r sults for predictable reasons (theoretical replication). We 
selected a set of innovation projects based on literal replication logic. Only innovations that are 
worth transferring should be transferred or deployed [23]. All projects had been successful initially 
and were expected to be deployed successfully. To control for initial success, all innovations 
selected had been winners of the best innovation award in the operator’s largest provincial 
company, which accounted for one third of the operator’s revenue and one fifth of its customer 
base. This provincial company is also the most innovative subsidiary among all 31 provincial 
companies, and it has 21 city-level subsidiaries and 16 functional departments and research 
centers. Each year, all departments and subsidiaries can apply for the “service innovation award” 
by submitting the relevant documents (application file and presentation slides) of their service 
innovation project. After oral presentations of all the projects and an evaluation process conducted 
by a group of fifteen to twenty experts in the company, all the projects are scored across several 
key aspects including innovativeness, financial and non-financial performance, generalizability, 
etc. Based on ratings from the evaluation panel, 35 service innovations each year are given awards 
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and expected to be further deployed. Then, national awards are selected from provincial awards 
with similar selection criteria and procedures. The cases chosen are shown in Table 1. 
--- Insert Table 1 about Here --- 
We collected objective data on deployment outcomes for each innovation, from the initial 
launch in April 2009 until late 2013. Additional data on the innovations and the processes during 
deployment was collected through interviews and archival documentation. Semi-structured 
interviews and secondary archival data were used to explore the innovation context and to clarify 
uncertainties in the data. Key managers involved in the deployment of the 10 projects were 
interviewed over a three-year period (see Figure 1). A detailed research protocol (Appendix A) 
was developed following the guidelines specified by Yin [41] to act as a basis for the interviews. 
Each key manager we interviewed was knowledgeable about the deployment of an individual 
project; for some projects we also had the chance to interview the top management and these 
interviews were conducted separately. The basic descriptive information on the cases and some 
information about the development team and process were accessed from archival documentation. 
The interviews were conducted in Chinese. An English-speaking researcher was present at several 
key meetings at which there was suitable translation. The interviews were recorded and 
subsequently transcribed, then the documents and interview notes were translated into English. 
The use of multiple sources of data contributes to reliability. To further ensure reliability and 
validity, we used multiple interviewers and fed the data and conclusions back to the managers.  
--- Insert Figure 1 about Here --- 
To study the deployment outcome, we drew on the measurement of the deployment of best 
practices used by other researchers. Jensen and Szulanski [12] measured the number of recipient 
units adopting the initiative studied. Done et al. [11] measured the degree to which the practices 
had been deployed within the organization, from all transferred to none transferred. Building on 
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these scales, we use a four-level model of deployment outcomes: no deployment, city-level 
deployment, provincial-level deployment, and national deployment.  
The analysis was conducted in three parts. We first documented the context for each project, 
based on the best innovation award documentation. We supplemented this documentation with 
semi-structured interviews with managers and engineers at various levels to gain an understanding 
of the context of the innovations, including the company’s innovation processes and the 
organizational and competitive environment. Second, we reviewed the objective data to analyze 
the trajectories and the outcomes of the deployment of the projects and to construct timelines over 
the period studied. Finally, we analyzed the interview data to build a picture of the process of 
deployment of each innovation and to identify key events. We followed the methodology of 
constructing and analyzing arrays suggested by Miles and Huberman [45]. Where we identified 
themes, we conducted additional interviews to examine the themes in other deployments. The 
qualitative data are summarized in Appendix B.  
IV. RESULTS 
The company studied was a multi-divisional company organized in three levels: local (typically a 
city subsidiary within a province), provincial, and national. Each provincial (or city) subsidiary is 
responsible for its own profit and resource allocation within the province (or city). There are 
functional departments and development labs at both the provincial and national headquarters 
which coordinate resource allocation among city- and province-level subsidiaries. For strategically 
important initiatives and innovations, the company may also set up new centers/bases (equivalent 
to provincial subsidiaries in terms of organizational hierarchy) to take charge of certain businesses 
and propel their deployment across the country. There were nine national centers/bases in total, 
mainly in (mobile) internet businesses. To provide an overview of the process studied, we describe 
a case that was a very successful innovation at the local level but that had problems in deployment. 
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This case illustrates the context of the research, the company’s deployment approach, and some of 
the issues found (see Appendix C). 
A. Deployment Outcomes 
For each case, we observed the deployment status up to the end of 2013. We documented the 
deployment steps from the initial local deployment to provincial and then national deployment. 
The deployment outcomes of the innovations varied greatly from no deployment at all to partial 
and to full deployment at the provincial or national level. The varying outcomes (indicating failures 
and successes) provide a rich practical base for us to build up new theory, as sound theories should 
be able to analyze failures [46]. The deployment outcomes are summarized in Table 2.  
--- Insert Table 2 about Here --- 
By the end of 2013, the organization had deployed three innovations across multiple 
provincial companies. For example, case 8, an electronic medical service, had been deployed 
across 16 cities in the province by July 2012, with 203 hospitals using the service. By July 2013, 
nearly all provincial companies were offering the service. This illustrates a provincial company 
that initially deployed an innovative service to all local divisions and then across multiple 
companies in the organization. We found similar patterns in cases 2 and 6. The organization fully 
deployed case 6 at the provincial level, and national deployment was successfully in progress, with 
full deployment in 10 provinces (10 million users) and building a national system (phase 1 would 
serve 27 million users).  
In four cases, there had been provincial deployment and some national deployment. In some, 
the innovation was clearly in the early stage of national deployment, and full deployment was 
expected. An example was case 1, the synergistic classroom, which had proved very successful. 
This innovation provided a service for schools to notify children of their homework assignments 
through their mobile phones. This was copied to their parents’ phones, allowing them to check that 
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their children did their homework on time. Teachers and parents strongly welcomed this 
innovation. The number of schools in the province using the service rose from 4,831 in September 
2012 to 11,636 in November 2013, and the number of student users rose from 1.55 million to 6.13 
million. Further deployment did not start until there had been substantial use in the originating 
province. Thus, by November 2013 only two other provincial companies were marketing the 
service. However, the company expected that the deployment would soon become much broader. 
In other cases, although some were deployed nationally, it was not clear whether there would 
be widespread deployment. For example, in case 5, although some provincial companies were 
using the innovation, others had chosen not to. Some companies encountering similar problems 
had already chosen to use local partners and develop a similar service independently. These cases 
illustrate that limited deployment may be due to the characteristics of the innovation and/or of the 
context of the potential adopter.  
Case 3, BlackBerry hosting for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), had been 
developed at the city level. However, after initial deployment to one other city, there was no further 
deployment. By this time, BlackBerry use was declining, so there were limited prospects for 
further deployment, and no effort was made to try to deploy it. Finally, for case 10, mobile payment 
of railway tickets, initial use at the city level encountered technical problems, and was eventually 
discontinued without deployment. We illustrate these outcomes in Figure 2.  
--- Insert Figure 2 about Here --- 
B. Strategies for Deployment 
We found both required and voluntary adoptions used as deployment strategies. A key element of 
the voluntary deployment was making the innovation more visible to other parts of the company. 
There was a policy of “showcasing” successful service innovations at the provincial and national 
levels. At the provincial level, the award process was highly visible and would make the innovation 
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known to the managers at the national headquarters but not necessarily to other provinces. All 
cases studied were award winners and would therefore have been visible to others in the province 
and at the national headquarters. At the national level, there was a parallel award system but with 
far fewer innovations from each of the 31 provinces. All national award winners would have been 
visible to the national headquarters and all provincial companies. Cases 5 and 7 won national 
awards and thus gained much more national visibility; case 8 was submitted for a national award 
and, although not a winner, gained considerable national visibility. The manager of case 5 reported 
that “the innovation won the national award; then the national headquarters arranged us to have 
meetings with other provinces and asked us to make presentations to them. The other provincial 
companies will make their own decision as to whether to adopt this solution or not, and all of our 
documents are available and open to them. If they want to adopt this solution, they can just copy 
what we did, or they can learn from us and develop their own solution.” There were also national 
events that showcased these awards; for example, case 4 was presented at a national event. The 
underlying logic of this showcasing was to demonstrate the nature and value of the innovation, to 
build connections with managers elsewhere, and to motivate them to consider taking the 
innovation on board as part of their portfolio of services or internal processes. However, it was left 
to local management to decide whether to adopt the innovations.  
When senior management saw the innovation as very important they sometimes exerted 
pressure throughout the company, a required-deployment strategy, requiring that all should adopt 
this service innovation. An example was case 2, “Mobile Market” which headquarters initiated as 
a key strategic initiative. The organization implemented the development in one province before 
rolling it out to all provinces. Although consumers from other provinces (who had not devoted 
efforts to coordinate with the originating province) may also buy and download apps from this 
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online platform, they were not motivated by substantial marketing programs, thus the number of 
consumers was not increasing as fast as in provinces using a required-deployment strategy. 
The president made regular visits to the provinces, where innovations were presented to him 
and his team. They could decide to showcase an innovation nationally or go one step further and 
decide to use a required-deployment strategy. Some innovations diffused through a required-
deployment strategy at the provincial level but a voluntary-deployment strategy at the national 
level, and vice versa. For example, an innovation that was performing very well, which initially 
diffused through voluntary adoption, would come to the attention of headquarters and could lead 
to the decision of changing to required adoption. Headquarters saw case 8, after having been very 
successfully deployed in the province, as an important innovation nationally. Therefore, the 
organization set up a center in another province to facilitate national deployment. At the national 
level, four innovations diffused through a required-deployment strategy, and six through a 
voluntary-deployment strategy initially. The showcasing and deployment strategies are 
summarized in Table 3. 
--- Insert Table 3 about Here --- 
When we examine the outcomes, all four with national-level required adoptions were fully 
deployed at the provincial level, and three (cases 1, 2, and 6) had strong national deployment. The 
other, case 4, had planned national deployment. Of the voluntary adoptions, only two of the six 
(cases 5 and 9) had full provincial deployment with limited national deployment. Case 8, although 
diffused through voluntary adoption at the province and national level, was changed to required 
adoption by the setting up of a national center. It was quickly deployed nationally; the others had 
far more limited deployment. It shows that the deployment strategies can be switched to required 
adoption to quicken the market success illustrated by voluntary adoption. In addition, among the 
three cases (3, 7, and 10) with a consistent voluntary-deployment strategy, showcasing at the 
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national level (case 7) led to wider deployment compared to showcasing at the provincial level or 
limited showcasing (cases 3 and 10). We therefore put forward the following propositions: 
 P1a: Required adoption leads to wider deployment than voluntary adoption, and changing 
from voluntary to required adoption will speed up the deployment process. 
P1b: Showcasing as a voluntary-deployment strategy conducted in wider scope will lead to 
wider deployment. 
C. Factors Affecting Deployment 
We observed several issues leading to resistance to adoption of the deployed service innovations. 
These issues included market fit and organizational fit. The smart city mobile service case 
described in Appendix C provides illustrations. The business models associated with the 
innovation were less attractive in other provinces, and this lack of market fit led to reluctance to 
adopt the innovation. In case 3, the use of BlackBerry devices declined significantly after the 
launch of the service, creating barriers to deployment. There was little motivation for other 
divisions to market an innovation with a declining market. Both are examples of lack of market 
fit.  
In case 7, others chose to use their own partners or to use different technology solutions. In 
case 5, many provincial companies chose to use local partners and developed a similar service 
independently. We see these as examples of the “not invented here” (NIH) syndrome, which is “a 
negative attitude to knowledge that originates from a source outside the own institution” [47]: 368. 
This is consistent with Szulanski [30], who saw NIH as a possible reason for the lack of adoption 
of practices being deployed. In both cases, this was probably amplified by the importance of 
guanxi, strong inter-personal and inter-organization ties, in China. 
These are examples of context-specific organizational fit. All cases in which we observed fit 
issues were associated with less effective deployment outcomes, but this negative impact seemed 
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to be weaker when there was a required-deployment strategy. We posit that if the company chooses 
a required-deployment strategy, either the possibility of lack of fit is low, or a strong required 
adoption will help organizations fully deploy the innovation despite the poor fit. Case 2 was such 
an example. The national headquarters proposed it as a key strategic initiative and asked the 
provincial company to develop and deploy it. The manager of case 2 suggested that “it would have 
been better if an internet company rather than a telecom develops this platform.” The department 
developing this innovation was then upgraded to a national base (an independent internet company, 
at the same level as a provincial company) to take charge of national deployment, and the initial 
objective for this national base was “not to make profits (as other provincial companies did) but to 
compete with other platforms provided by internet companies or mobile phone manufacturers.”  
We therefore put forward the following proposition: 
P2: Poor market or organizational fit leads to less effective deployment of all service 
innovations, yet this effect is weaker when a required adoption is used as the deployment strategy. 
We also find evidence that poor market or organizational fit issues cannot always be fully 
eased by a required-deployment strategy. In case 4, although it was successfully deployed across 
the province, and all other provinces were also required to adopt the innovation (the national 
deployment was planned centrally), the actual national deployment was delayed, indicating that 
(organizational) fit issues still hindered the deployment. In addition, we need to acknowledge that 
market or organizational fit is dynamic and may vary with changes in the market. In case 3, by the 
time deployment efforts had started, the market attractiveness had substantially diminished. As 
deployment progresses, the benefits of an innovation at the time of launch may diminish and thus 
make the innovation unattractive for other parts of the corporation to adopt. In case 10, the 
technology used was called “RFSIM” technology, and it allowed users to use their mobile phones 
(with SIM cards) as railway tickets and use the tool kit pre-installed in SIM cards to pay for the 
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tickets. However, the innovation was only tested in two cities and was not deployed at all, and at 
the same time smartphones based on Android or iOS became more and more popular in China. 
Then toward the end of 2013 the external partner China Railway launched its own mobile app for 
national-wide online ticket ordering, which made this innovation less attractive and far less likely 
to merit deployment. These cases suggested that slow or delayed deployment risks loss of market 
or organizational fit. 
Further, based on results from the case analyses we summarize the findings concerning the 
locus of deployment and deployment outcomes. We first compared locally developed and 
headquarters-developed innovations, and the data indicate that although some locally developed 
innovations were deployed widely, more of those developed at the headquarters level had been 
widely deployed (see Table 4). The managers we interviewed provided support and explanations 
for this. The manager of case 5 pointed out that “at the provincial headquarters level, it is very 
easy for us to implement better solutions or innovative ideas across the province, such as this case. 
But for the city-level companies (subsidiaries), it is an issue to diffuse their innovations to other 
cities within the province.” The manager of case 4 explained that “the city-level companies are 
limited in their scope, and sometimes what they think is useful and characteristic may not be so 
useful to other cities.” 
--- Insert Table 4 about Here --- 
We then sought evidence for the role of senior management in innovations developed by 
subsidiaries. Of the four locally developed innovations, the strongest senior management support 
was in cases 7 and 9, in which senior management was directly involved. Both cases achieved 
better deployment than cases 3 and 10, which had limited support. Even for the innovations with 
a required-deployment strategy, senior management attention was an important driver for 
deployment. We had the chance to interview a manager from the company’s external partner for 
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case 1, who helped with the local deployment in different schools across different cities. The 
manager suggested that “the deployment outcome is determined by their head (city-level general 
manager), although his or her performance indicators set by the provincial headquarters were not 
directly related to this innovation; if their head pays much attention to this innovation, they will 
allocate more resources and devote more efforts to coordinate with us.” Further, although the three 
national-deployment cases (2, 6 and 8) did not have the formal involvement of provincial senior 
management, there were other forms of management attention (see Appendix B). Senior 
management attention was also associated with government support. Case 1 illustrated this 
correlation, as when media reported on the innovation the company was invited to report to the 
national Ministry of Education. Afterward, other provincial companies were required to learn from 
the case province.  
Given the organizational structure of this large telecom firm, senior management attention 
can also be determined by their potential opportunities of promotion. One clear promotion path is 
from provincial to central management positions, thus the competition between the provincial 
subsidiaries could be an important influential factor in service innovation deployment, especially 
when there are significant duplicate innovation efforts across the subsidiaries. This creates an 
extrinsic motivation for senior managers to deploy their own service innovations, but may also 
lead to NIH syndrome in adopting service innovations developed by others.  
Our interviews indicated that there was a complex relationship between motivation and actual 
managerial decisions and/or efforts toward deployment. For example, in case 2 (required 
adoption), the team made a lot of effort to deploy the innovation because they felt that it would 
make the provincial operation famous for innovation compared to other provinces. Similarly, in 
the smart city mobile service (case 7, voluntary adoption) described in Appendix C, there was also 
intrinsic motivation to deploy; managers reported pride and the associated kudos of seeing their 
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innovation deployed as motivating them to actively seek to deploy their innovations. However, the 
managers also indicated that involvement in deployment would hinder their work and that there 
were no direct incentives for deployment. This reflected a lack of extrinsic motivation, which 
potentially contributed to limited deployment. In other cases, many interviewees indicated that 
extrinsic motivation was important in their involvement with deployment. For example, in case 1 
(required adoption), the city-level subsidiaries needed to decide whether to allocate resources to 
deploy the innovation. They stated that “it would be more easily deployed if the provincial 
headquarters set performance indicators directly related with this innovation.” Specific targets 
were seen to act as an incentive for managers to support and work on deployment. In another 
example, interviewees believed that one of the key factors in engaging them in deployment was 
supporting actions that could lead to their supervisor’s promotion. This may be particular to the 
Chinese company context, as the promotion of a supervisor also opens up opportunities for 
promotion of subordinates. Based on these findings, we put forward the following proposition: 
P3: Extrinsic and intrinsic motivation can both contribute to deployment outcomes, but the 
lack of an extrinsic motivation hinders deployment significantly, and this negative impact is 
stronger when a voluntary adoption is used as the deployment strategy. 
In deploying service innovations, the capabilities needed for deployment may not exist in the 
innovation team; there may be a handover to teams or organizations with more appropriate 
capabilities. Handovers varied from transferring responsibility to a new team to, as in case 2, 
upgrading the provincial department to national status as this gave them greater ability to 
coordinate with all provincial-level companies so that the deployment could be conducted more 
smoothly. Five of the cases—1, 2, 4, 6, and 7—involved formal handovers. In the five cases with 
handovers, there were two full national deployments and one partial national deployment, 
compared with two partial national deployments among the five cases without handovers. These 
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results do not provide support for previous literature emphasizing the stickiness of handover 
knowledge and difficulties in coordination or knowledge-sharing. Instead, our data indicated that 
when the teams handed the innovations over to a new team, the deployment was more successful. 
We conclude that the disadvantages of handovers were outweighed by their advantages when new 
skills and/or resources are important. We therefore put forward the following proposition: 
P4: Deployment is more effective if responsibility for deployment is handed over to a team 
with appropriate capabilities. 
Managers saw handovers as being useful in two main related contexts. First, they are useful 
when the development team did not have the resources to manage the deployment. Second, the 
teams used handovers when deployment was beyond the scope of the development team. For 
example, a local development and marketing group may not have the skills necessary to deploy an 
innovation across the company. In this sense, the handover may also indicate the change of 
deployment strategy. As shown in cases 4 and 8, a handover is needed when the deployment 
strategy changes from voluntary adoption to required adoption. We also expect that different 
handover experiences may exist when subsidiary A starts the innovation adoption process before 
the change of deployment strategy while subsidiary B starts the process after the change. We 
suggest that for subsidiary A, more coordination work or reprocessing may be needed in handover, 
as it may already have its own teams and procedures for innovation adoption. Although our cases 
did not provide such evidence, we believe that this could be a further research opportunity. 
V. DISCUSSION 
A. Theoretical Contributions 
Companies put significant effort into developing innovations both for internal use and for external 
markets. However, in multi-divisional and multinational organizations, local success in 
implementing such innovations is not enough. Companies seeking to maximize the return on their 
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innovation efforts must seek to deploy the innovations across the organization. Our research 
indicates that this task is complex and sometimes difficult. To address this issue, companies need 
policies and practices that support the deployment of service innovations. We proposed two 
alternate deployment strategies,  required adoption and voluntary adoption, an important extension 
to those suggested by Ghoshal and Bartlett [7]. Ghoshal and Bartlett [7] studied required adoption 
(top down) and diffusion (bottom up, but also required), whereas we have taken the broader view 
that innovators may or may not be required to seek to diffuse the innovation. Our data indicate that 
a required adoption is more effective than a voluntary adoption in further deploying the service 
innovations, and that companies may change their strategies between required adoption and 
voluntary adoption, leading to more complex strategic choices of deployment patterns. Stimulating 
service innovation is a major research priority seen by leading service scholars [1, 2]. By exploring 
required- and voluntary-deployment strategies, our research advances theory and practice of 
service innovation, as the final success of service innovations depends largely on the effective 
deployment of initial innovation outcomes [6].  
Addressing our first research question, the case evidence confirmed that the company clearly 
used both required- and voluntary-deployment strategies for almost all the innovations studied. 
However, companies may also change their strategies from one to the other. In addition to 
individual innovations diffused through either a required adoption or voluntary adoption, we found 
other patterns. The first was a required adoption at the local level but a voluntary adoption 
nationally. The equivalent in a multinational firm would be a required adoption in the country of 
origin but a voluntary adoption internationally. A second pattern was starting with a voluntary 
adoption, but converting to a required adoption when the importance or success of the innovation 
became visible to senior management. We therefore propose that required and voluntary adoptions 
are key strategic choices in the deployment of innovations. The choice is dynamic, and any 
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innovation can be shifted from one strategy to the other during the deployment process. In addition, 
by default, innovations may not necessarily be chosen for deployment at all.  
To address our second research question, we explored with the company their reasons for 
choices made between required adoptions, which would clearly lead to faster deployment, and 
voluntary adoptions, which could be slower in a context in which the organization considered 
deployment important. The prime reason for needing to make such decisions was the volume of 
service innovations being developed each year, often exceeding 20,000. Given that the managerial 
resources needed to rapidly deploy an innovation were limited, the company had to make choices. 
They put forward the following criteria for choosing a required-deployment strategy: first, which 
innovations would be most beneficial to the company as a whole given the allocation of these 
resources? This could be the presenc  of clear and achievable benefits and the likelihood of 
successful adoption. The interviewees saw some innovations as easy to transfer, whereas others 
would require substantial local tailoring. This is consistent with our proposition on the need for 
market and organizational fit. Second, would the innovation benefit from promotion through 
making it visible across the company via mechanisms such as innovation competitions and 
showcasing? Finally, were the benefits strong enough to justify the resources allocated for a 
required adoption? The stronger the cross-company benefits, the greater the likelihood of choosing 
a required adoption. Despite these criteria, managers stated that making such decisions in the 
context of multiple innovations was very difficult. 
We conclude that in any organization seeking intra-company deployment of many 
innovations, the company must make decisions about which innovations to select for investment 
in deployment. There are two potential limits to the number of innovations that can be actively 
deployed. The first limit is the resources available. A required-deployment strategy requires 
considerable resources, and many elements of voluntary-deployment strategy such as internal 
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prizes and showcasing also demand resources. Deployment also requires resources by the adopter, 
who may not be able to exploit innovations because of a lack of absorptive capacity [30]. The 
second limit is the number of innovations that any part of the organization can adopt at one time.   
An important managerial choice is how to organize for deployment. For example, decisions 
need to be made about whether and when to hand over an innovation from the original team to a 
new team responsible for deployment. Deployment requires internal knowledge transfer, and much 
knowledge can often be “sticky” [35]. Thus handovers to a new team requiring sticky knowledge 
to be transferred can negatively affect deployment. However, the case evidence points in the other 
direction. This may indicate that problems associated with sticky knowledge may be outweighed 
by the advantages of choosing another team with proper resources or deployment skills. 
To address the third research question, we summarized the case evidence and put forward 
three more propositions (P2, P3 and P4) concerning the other factors that influence the deployment 
outcomes jointly with required- and voluntary-deployment strategies. The case evidence supported 
that locally developed innovations face greater barriers to deployment than those developed more 
centrally. Locally developed innovations are usually less visible, and are more likely to encounter 
difficulties in gaining management attention or having the resources, skills, and motivation needed 
for deployment. This is consistent with Ambos and Birkinshaw [29], who conclude that when 
aiming to integrate a portfolio of differentiated subsidiaries, the allocation of headquarters’ 
attention has become a key strategic issue. Distance from headquarters can lead to a lack of skill 
and resources for deployment, lower levels of management visibility and support, and lower 
motivation to deploy. As a result, locally developed innovations may take longer to deploy. 
Innovations developed locally, often in the front line, could thus be more difficult to deploy than 
those developed at the headquarters level. This leads us to a dilemma facing the management of 
service organizations. Because of the customer-facing nature of services, many important 
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innovations will be co-developed near the front line but will not necessarily be visible to senior 
management or the wider organization. Thus, it is important for organizations to pay close 
attention to seeking and recognizing the locally developed innovations to avoid losing many of the 
benefits of innovation. 
Although intrinsic motivation is clearly very important for the development of innovation, we 
observed that without extrinsic innovation, the motivation to innovate may not turn into the 
motivation to deploy, which hinders the deployment more significantly. This may be particularly 
true for locally developed innovations for which the need to face day-to-day operational pressures 
may conflict with the deployment targets. This is consistent with Szulanski [30], who argues that 
there are motivational barriers to knowledge transfer. As such, companies would learn that 
motivational efforts could be done in tandem with deployment strategies to encourage faster and 
wider adoption. 
With a voluntary, diffusion-based, model of deployment, if an innovation does not provide 
value to the receiving organization, we would expect some resistance to adoption. Even when there 
is required adoption, a lack of internal or external fit for the receiving organization may create 
resistance to deployment. This indicates that even when an organization is pursuing a required-
deployment strategy, the organization should pay close attention to fit issues. Questions about fit 
may lead to the possibility of adapting the innovation to enhance fit or to selectively deploy the 
innovation only in locations where the fit is good. We also observed that the degree of fit with the 
market may decrease over time, which often calls for rapid deployment of service innovations. 
B. Limitations 
Although the sample size was l0 projects, which is suitable for case-based research [42], this 
number means that the results should be treated with caution. Although the case data provided 
support with details for the propositions, further research with different methods and possibly 
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larger samples will be needed. We selected a single firm and a rapidly changing industry as the 
context for service innovation deployment. This control allowed us to develop strong insights into 
the processes involved but also limits generalizability [42]. The outcome variable was mainly 
about the scale of deployment given the rapidly changing industry and the need for cross-case 
comparability, yet we expect that in other stable service industries different outcome variables 
might be appropriate and lead to promising new findings. 
We studied deployment in China. Because of the size of the country and the scale of the major 
companies, China is an appropriate setting to examine deployment and presents great opportunities 
for operations and innovation management research [48]. Conducting research in a single country, 
or region, whether China or the West, raises questions of generalizability. However, the context of 
a large multi-divisional and multi-location company in China is comparable to the context of 
similar sized companies and countries worldwide. Recent years have seen high-tech service 
innovations prosper in China, enjoying the advantages of fast deployment in a large domestic 
market. For countries such as India, the United States, Russia, and Brazil, which also have large 
populations and/or use single official languages, our findings may be more generalizable, yet 
caution still needs to be taken in contexts of different governance structures and regulations. 
In addition, the operations in multiple, very large provinces are in many ways equivalent to 
multinational companies operating in multiple countries. However, we observed several specific 
aspects of business in China that affected deployment and which may lead to some bias. One aspect 
is guanxi networks which are essential for doing business in China [48]. Although guanxi has been 
viewed as a positive aspect of supply chain management in China, in the context of deployment, 
it seemed to have led to the possibility of NIH because companies preferred to work with their 
own networks instead of networks from other provinces. We also observed some aspects of 
motivation such as the importance of supporting one’s boss’s promotion, which might be specific 
Page 27 of 38 Transactions on Engineering Management
For Peer Review
28 
to the Chinese context. However, these aspects were only part of the case evidence behind our 
propositions, and we feel that even taking into account the Chinese context the relevant 
propositions were still insightful. For future research, replication in a Western context and in 
different services would give greater validity to the results. 
C. Conclusions and Implications for Practice 
Implicit in innovation research is the assumption that a successful innovation will be exploited 
across the organization. However, our research challenges this notion. Consistent with the research 
in other areas, we found that the transfer of innovations (i.e., deployment) is difficult. Based on a 
longitudinal study, these results contribute to our understanding of the strategies and mechanisms 
of deployment and the factors that may contribute to or hinder it. We proposed and explored 
voluntary adoption and required adoption as two strategies for deployment, and we provided 
insights into the effects of different deployment patterns and their contingencies. 
Our results are relevant to service organizations that increasingly need to innovate rapidly and 
successfully. Strategic choices, such as voluntary and required adoption, can help the organizations 
become more successful. The first implication for practice is that promoting an innovation and 
requiring others to adopt, a required-deployment strategy will lead to more rapid deployment, but 
there are resource constraints on how many innovations can be required to adopt at any one time. 
This calls for a strategy for identifying which innovations should be required to adopt and which 
not, and for allocation of scarce managerial resources. This strategy should be dynamic as the 
potential for some innovations may be revealed only after a period of use (which is often local). 
The top management of the case company also stated that “our judgement about a particular 
important innovation based on the current situation may not be accurate enough, thus sometimes 
we may use a pull strategy (i.e., voluntary adoption) first to test and see if we need to push (i.e., 
change to required adoption) later on.” The second implication is to have in place mechanisms for 
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making other potentially valuable innovations visible to potential internal adopters through a 
voluntary-deployment strategy. Such mechanisms could include, but are not limited to, those 
observed in the cases such as best innovation competitions and showcasing. The third implication 
is that market and organizational fit and extrinsic and intrinsic motivation would affect deployment 
outcomes jointly with deployment strategies. As such, managerial efforts addressing fit or 
motivational issues could be done in tandem with deployment strategies to encourage faster and 
wider adoption. The final implication is that if the development team does not have the necessary 
capabilities or resources to manage deployment, they should hand the innovation over to a team 
that does.  
There is scope for further research in most of the areas studied, for example, how effective 
decisions can be made regarding required- versus voluntary-deployment strategies and allocating 
resources for deployment. We identified organizing for deployment as an important decision, and 
there is scope for more in-depth research into how to organize for deployment and what the trade-
offs are between different choices. Future research into the deployment of service innovations 
should contribute to maximizing their potential. Further, research opportunities also exist in 
extending the current focus on required versus voluntary deployment, and there is potentially a 
meaningful matrix with required/voluntary deployment on one dimension and top-down/bottom-
up on the other dimension.  
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Figure 1: Longitudinal study timeline–a typical case. 
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Figure 2: Deployment trajectories of cases 1–10. 
 
Table 1: Cases and development background. 
Case Name Description Where developed 
1 Synergistic 
classroom 
An online platform that provides educational resources 
and support for teachers, students and their parents, in 
addition to the traditional face-to-face teaching and 
learning conducted in school. 
Initiated by a small 
developer in Beijing. 
Taken on by the 
province. 
2 Mobile 
Market 
An online application store for smartphones which 
provides services such as testing, charging, and 
advertising to external developers (individuals and 
companies) so that they can develop and upload various 
smartphone applications and contents (music, videos, or 
books) to the platform. Consumers can buy and 
download the apps and contents to their devices. 
Initiated at the national 
level. Handed over to 
the province as it was 
the biggest province and 
seen as the most 
innovative. 
3 BlackBerry 
hosting for 
SMEs 
BlackBerry enterprise email service was faced with a 
problem that many small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs) do not have standard email servers, thus a city 
subsidiary developed a solution for SMEs. 
City 
4 Marketing 
operations 
monitoring 
An IT system designed by two departments at the 
headquarters, which is used to monitor the performance 
indicators of all city-level subsidiaries in the province. 
Alerts and suggestions from headquarters will be sent 
through the system. 
Province 
5 Cloned 
cards 
control 
A solution developed to control the problem of cloned 
SIM cards of mobile phone. In the original system a 
loophole existed through which one type of SIM card 
could be cloned. The original system could not fix the 
problem, even though the problem can be detected. 
Province 
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6 Customized 
signature 
A new service that provides added value to the 
customers in a way that a customer can set personally 
tailored text information. Then when he makes voice-
calls (either incoming or outgoing) with others, the text 
will appear on the screen of the mobile phones of others. 
Provincial product 
development center. 
Developed jointly with 
data business operations. 
7 Smart city 
mobile 
service 
Based on the combination of RFID technology and 
traditional SIM cards, RFSIM, customers can use their 
mobile phones as transportation card to take the Metro 
and buses and make payments using mobile phones. 
City 
8 Electronic 
medical 
service 
The basic function of this service is that customers can 
call the hotline to make appointments for medical 
services instead of queuing up in hospitals. It also 
provides other related services such as hospital maps.  
Province. Initiated by 
local president who 
wanted to enter the 
healthcare market. 
9 Managing 
customer 
account 
balance 
New practices have been developed together with an 
information system to monitor and manage the residual 
amount in customer accounts and analyze the related 
customer behaviors, to achieve precision marketing for 
different market segments. 
City. Was seen by 
provincial management, 
who encouraged 
development and 
deployment. 
10 Mobile 
payment of 
railway 
tickets 
Based on RFSIM technology, it was developed for users 
who regularly take the high-speed railway between two 
major cities in a province, allowing users to use mobile 
phones to replace railway tickets and use the tool kit pre-
installed in SIM cards to pay for the tickets. 
City 
 
Table 2: Summary of deployment at end of data collection. 
Case Origin Local 
deployment 
Provincial 
deployment 
National deployment 
1.Synergistic 
classroom 
Provincial Yes Yes 2 other provinces, further national 
deployment in progress. 
2. Mobile Market Provincial 
and national  
Yes Yes Yes 
3. BlackBerry 
hosting for SMEs 
Local Yes No Almost none, only 1 city in another 
province adopted. 
4. Marketing 
operations 
monitoring 
Provincial Yes Yes Limited: national deployment was 
planned but delayed. 
5.Cloned cards 
control 
Provincial Yes Yes Limited, but other provinces learned and 
developed their own solutions. 
6.Customized 
signature 
Provincial Yes Yes Yes, national deployment near complete. 
7. Smart city 
mobile service 
Local Yes Limited: 1 
other city 
Limited: 2 cities in 2 other provinces.  
8. Electronic 
medical service 
Provincial Yes Yes Yes (almost all provincial companies) 
9. Managing 
customer account 
balance 
Local Yes Yes Limited, just started national deployment 
(several cities in other provinces). 
10. Mobile 
payment of railway 
tickets 
Local No (only 
tested) 
No No 
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Table 3: Deployment strategies. 
Case Examples of showcasing Required or voluntary 
(province) 
Required or voluntary  
(national) 
1 Provincial innovation award 
and limited showcasing 
nationally, innovation was 
reported by some newspapers 
and main media 
Required Required 
2 Highly visible from the start Required Required 
3 Limited or none None Voluntary if at all 
4 Displayed at a national 
conference 
Initially voluntary, then 
required. Central 
installation, all cities 
must use it. 
Required. All provinces were 
required to adopt. 
5 Won national award Required Voluntary 
6 Details were shared online 
with other provinces 
Required Required. Company saw this as 
a product that all provinces 
should have and asked all 
provinces to adopt. 
7 Local and national innovation 
awards 
Voluntary. Only one 
city has adopted and 
even then has modified. 
Voluntary 
8 Showcase through applying for 
national innovation awards 
(although they did not win) 
Voluntary: the 
government and 
enterp ise customer 
department asks, not 
orders, subsidiaries (city 
level) to adopt. 
Voluntary (then became 
required) 
9 Limited Required Voluntary if at all 
10 Limited Voluntary Voluntary 
 
 
Table 4: Locus of innovation and deployment. 
Deployment Number of innovations deployed 
Provincially developed Locally developed 
National   3  
Provincial and part national 2 2 
Provincial 1  
Local/city   2 
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APPENDIX A. THE CASE RESEARCH PROTOCOL 
Description:  
This document serves as a guideline that has specified the types of questions that we would like to 
ask about the service innovation project.  
Background: 
1. Why did this project start and who proposed it? 
2. Please describe how your company organized this project, the team members of the project and 
their respective responsibilities. 
3. Did this project involve other departments/subsidiaries/external partners in development 
process? How did they involve? 
4. Could you please describe the development process of this innovation? What difficulties and 
how to deal with? 
5. How successful was this project in terms of prize-winning? What were the factors do you think 
that could lead to success of the development? 
Deployment of Service Innovations: 
6. Could you please describe the process of deployment and handover (if there was a handover)? 
Are there any interactions between development team and deployment team before and after the 
handover? What were the interactions?  
7. How did the project go after winning the award? What is the current status of this innovation? 
Has the innovation been deployed nationally or is it going to be deployed nationally? What are the 
incentives and attractiveness for the deployment of this innovation? 
8. Who/Which department(s) was responsible for the deployment of the innovation? 
 If it was the same department, did the members of project team change? 
 If it was another department, did the original team get involved or not? 
 How did top management support the deployment of the innovation? 
9. Were there any external partners involved in the deployment of this innovation? What were the 
roles played by them and how did you collaborate and interact with them? 
10. What were the difficulties faced by this innovation when it was deployed? How did the 
company deal with these difficulties generally and for this project specifically? 
11. Do you think this innovation has been well deployed? Can you provide some current data about 
the performance of this innovation, e.g., impact on profits/revenues/sales/market share? Are there 
any other possibilities that this innovation could be more widely and well deployed? 
12. Are there any questions that you think I should have asked but I haven’t? 
13. Are there any other people that you think I should interview? 
14. If you would start this project today, how would you manage it differently? 
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APPENDIX B: SUMMARY OF QUALITATIVE CASE DATA  
Case Name Initial 
deployment 
Deployment to province Deployment 
nationally 
Management 
Attention 
Handover Showcasing Motivation and other issues 
1 Synergistic 
classroom 
Persuaded 
education ministry 
and then school 
by school. 
High and significant increase in 
the province (Sept. 2012–Nov. 
2013: from 4,831 schools to 
11,636 schools; 1.55 million 
parents and students to 5 
million parents and 6.13 
million students). 
Did not begin until 
substantial use in 
province. Two other 
provinces, deployed and 
broad deployment 
planned. 
Provincial 
president and 
two vice 
presidents listed 
as team 
members. 
Multiple handovers from 
and to external partners 
and to different 
subsidiaries. 
Initially via newspaper 
reporting. Demonstrated 
to national Ministry of 
Education. Other 
provinces required to 
learn from the province. 
“It would be more easily 
deployed if the provincial 
headquarters set performance 
indicators directly related to this 
innovation.” 
2 Mobile 
Market 
Province. Taken over by national, became 
the company’s southern base – 
part of national, so that 
deployment could be done 
more smoothly nationally as 
they need to coordinate with all 
provincial companies. 
“As a strategic priority 
of the national 
headquarters, although it 
was locally developed, 
the deployment of it 
across all provinces was 
well supported.”  
Seen by 
national 
headquarters 
from the start as 
a national 
priority. 
From provincial 
department to national 
base.  
Won national innovation 
award. Presented at 
national meetings. 
Featured in annual report 
as a big move for the 
company. 
Intrinsic motivation in making the 
provincial operation famous; 
direct revenue as a potential 
motivator to adopt. Issue as to 
who bears the cost of deployment 
within other provinces.  
3 BlackBerry 
hosting for 
SMEs 
None. None. Only one city visited and 
copied. Still only two 
cities, and customers are 
slowly being lost. 
Limited 
support. 
None. None. Increase in revenue from data 
business. 
4 Marketing 
operations 
monitoring 
Trialed in city and 
then rapidly 
deployed in 
province. 
Fully deployed. City-level 
subsidiaries required to adopt. 
Full national deployment 
still in progress. Slowed 
by reorganization of 
responsibilities in the 
national headquarters. 
 Formal handover for 
national deployment, from 
Enterprise/Government 
customer department to 
marketing department. 
Displayed at national 
event. 
Easily deployed in the province, 
as the city-level subsidiaries were 
just required by the headquarters 
to implement this system. 
5 Cloned 
cards 
control 
Rapid deployment 
by modifying 
central software at 
the province level. 
Complete. Limited, as other 
provinces have their own 
systems thus 1) they do 
not necessarily have this 
problem, and 2) they 
need to user their own 
local partners. 
Provincial vice-
president 
involvement. 
 Gained high visibility 
from national award. 
Some provinces had chosen to 
use local partners and develop a 
similar service independently. 
6 Customized 
signature 
Pilot 
commercialization 
in province (1 
million users). 
Two major cities 
and some 
volunteer 
subsidiaries. Then 
handed over to 
operations for full 
deployment. 
Complete. Near complete. 10 
provinces by July 2012 
with 10 million users. 
240 million RMB p.a. A 
national system for this 
service is being built, 
and phase 1 will be able 
to serve 27 million users. 
Some senior 
management 
involvement in 
approval. 
Formal handover to 
operations. 
Details were shared 
online with other 
provinces. 
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7 Smart city 
mobile 
service 
In city Deployed to one other city in 
province. 
Two additional cities. Direct 
involvement of 
provincial vice 
president. 
Formal handover. Gained high visibility 
from national award. 
No direct incentives for 
development team to deploy. 
Other parts of the organization 
want to do it on their own way. 
One provincial subsidiary used a 
different technological solution. 
Another province wanted to use 
its own technology partner. Being 
unable to build on the original 
technology partner’s expertise 
making potential adoption more 
problematic and slower. 
8 Electronic 
medical 
service 
Local 
development. 
Used by 203 hospitals in 16 
cities as of July 2012, 244 
hospitals as of Nov. 2013. 
Most provincial 
companies provide this 
service. 
Headquarters 
support for 
national 
deployment. 
Seen by headquarters as an 
important innovation to 
deploy nationally. 
They therefore set up a 
center in another province 
charged with facilitating 
national deployment.       
Submitted for a national 
award, and, although not 
a winner, gained 
considerable national 
visibility. 
The initial purpose of this 
innovation was to provide social 
benefits thus it was not making 
money. For individuals, there was 
no direct financial benefit. 
9 Managing 
customer 
account 
balance 
Local 
development at 
city level. 
Rapidly deployed across the 
province. 
National deployment 
started. 
Direct 
involvement of 
provincial vice 
president. 
 The vice president 
organized a provincial 
conference in the city 
subsidiary to share the 
experience to other 
cities. 
Then some other 
provincial companies 
also came to learn the 
experience. 
 
10 Mobile 
payment of 
railway 
tickets 
Used locally.  Widespread deployment was 
planned. After initial use at the 
city level, encountered 
technical problems, and use 
was eventually discontinued 
without any deployment. 
None.  Not applicable.  It was China’s first case of 
mobile payment in railway tickets 
and was seen as the start of 
cooperation between the company 
and China Railway. 
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APPENDIX C: ILLUSTRATIVE CASE -- SMART CITY MOBILE SERVICE (CASE 7) 
This innovation was part of the development of a “smart city” in a major provincial city. In collaboration 
with the city and a technology supplier, a mobile phone payment system for all transportation within 
the city was developed. Despite costs being higher than anticipated, the service was considered very 
successful and won local and national innovation awards. Given the clear success, national headquarters 
actively encouraged deployment, promoted the service to other cities and provinces, and showcased it 
via a national innovation award. Despite this, the deployment was much slower than expected. By the 
end of the study, only one city in the province and two cities in other provinces had adopted the service.  
The case had several issues affecting deployment. Although there was personal motivation to deploy, 
there were no direct incentives to support deployment. The team members’ opportunities for promotion 
did not depend on deployment, and senior management did not provide incentivization to deploy the 
service. Second, despite headquarters’ active support for deployment, there was no systematic 
nationwide effort to deploy. Additionally, other divisions wanted to adapt the innovation to their own 
circumstances, adding time and cost. For example, one provincial subsidiary that adopted the innovation 
used a different technological solution. Another province wanted to use its own technology partner 
instead of the partner from the original city. These subsidiaries were therefore unable to build on the 
technology partner’s expertise, making potential adoption more problematic and slower. Finally, the 
business model that worked in the first city was not always applicable in other cities. The original city 
was motivated to become a smart city and provided financial and non-financial support. The average 
age in the city was around 30, which also facilitated the adoption of smart services. Other cities may not 
have had this motivation. Thus, the business model of the innovation might be context-specific. 
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